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Operation Barbarossa: The German Invasion of the Soviet Union

Operation Fritz, Directive 21, and Operation Barbarossa: three names for Hitler's momentous plan to invade the Soviet Union during World War II. Conceived as a solution to Hitler's lebensraum problem, the operation was gargantuan from the very beginning. Guarded by the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, Hitler allowed himself to plan for the invasion that could catapult Germany to complete world dominance. Plans were made and discarded several times before the German High Command finally decided on the final one. That plan, however, had to be postponed because of the ineptitude of German allies and the emotion with which Hitler ran the German military. Barbarossa began with a tremendous success that only waned after the first few months. That waning was due to Hitler's spastic commands to the German military, poor management of time, and the consequent descent of winter on the German troops. The failure of Barbarossa, however, left Europe with the residual effects for many decades afterwards. The immense planning, effort, manpower, and influence that went into and came out of Barbarossa were all strong indicators of its place atop the pedestal of 'great' military invasions.

Operation Barbarossa was conceived by Hitler long before it had ever been given a name or form. According to Paul K. Davis, a professor of defense planning and counter-terrorism policy, Mein Kampf, Hitler's famous composition, outlined many ways in how to restore Germany to its pre-Treaty of Versailles glory. One thing Germany needed to do in order to restore its pride was to reclaim the land lost in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Bolsheviks. Such reclamation would have been valid, Hitler contended, because Germany had conquered it in war and would simply be getting back what Der Vaterland rightfully deserved. The areas Germany had conquered in World War I were Russia's best; farmland in the Ukraine, the cities of Kiev and Minsk, and the ports on the Baltic Sea were all extremely valuable. Those areas, along with others in European Russia, were made even more valuable due to Hitler's lebensraum policy, which dictated that both Germany and the German people needed "living space" to grow into. Germany needed space and there was no nation that had more of it than the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union not only had space where the German people could have lived, but it also had an incredibly large population that could be forced into slave labor for the German war machine. (Davis 408-410) Thus, by necessity of Hitler's stipulations, the seeds of Barbarossa's conception were being planted as early as 1925 when Mein Kampf was first published.

Although Hitler's remarks in Mein Kampf should have worried any leader of the day-and Stalin most especially-, Hitler never overtly threatened the Soviet Union. While Hitler had many ideological differences with Stalin and his Communist regime, he also realized the importance of realpolitik and how it could affect his plans for war. When Germany's relations with France and Great Britain grew strained over the issue of Poland, it became obvious that some sort of resolution with the Soviet Union needed to be reached. This conclusion was similarly reached by Klaus P. Fischer, a professor of cultural and intellectual history at the University of California-Santa Barbara. (Fischer 437)

The benefits of a non-aggression treaty far outweighed any ideological disagreements Hitler had with the Soviet Union. Throughout his career, Hitler had spoken out vehemently against fighting a two-front war such as Germany had done in World War I. Signing a deal with the Soviet Union would eliminate that danger, allowing Hitler to focus all his manpower and resources on France and Great Britain after defeating Poland. Hitler also hoped that with Poland surrounded by unfriendly powers and the Soviet Union bound to not intervene, Britain and France would be forced to rescind their promise of protecting Poland at all costs. Even if Britain and France did make good on their promises to Poland and went so far as to blockade Germany, the Nazis would be able to ride it out well enough with the Soviet Union taking up any slack. A union with Soviet Russia was thus mandatory before Hitler could realistically achieve any of his goals, especially considering the likelihood that if he didn't net the Soviet Union, the western powers would. (Fischer 437-439)

Despite the many obvious advantages for Germany in a Soviet-Nazi pact, Hitler approached the negations for one with extreme caution and utmost suspicion. The same was true for those on the Soviet side of the table. Negotiations stagnated until Hitler sent Stalin a "personal telegraph" asking for his foreign minister to be received for further negotiations. Soon thereafter, Hitler was notified of the Soviets' acceptance of the terms. Upon hearing of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, most of the world was in a state of shock. The union of the two irreconcilable enemies was unfathomable. Not only had the world not expected such a treaty, but it had also had no word of it due to the secrecy in which the meetings were held. Even when the treaty was announced, the full terms of the deal were not revealed until after the Nazi defeat in 1945. When the treaty was first announced, it was only said that the two nations had signed a treaty assuring nonaggression for ten years. The fact was that the treaty also included provisions for dividing up Poland as well as placing a few Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) under a Soviet sphere of influence. (Fischer 437-438)

The German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact was never expected to last the full ten years by the world and most especially it was expected to last that long by neither Hitler nor Stalin. Both leaders had, in the back of their minds, a realization that the union would end before the prescription was up. The question was who would make the first step?

Trevor Dupuy, the American with the longest service record in Burma during World War II and former Director of the Ohio State Military Studies Program estimated in the late fall and early winter of 1940, serious plans for Operation Barbarossa began. Hitler, having conquered France and subdued Great Britain, felt confident in the power Germany had at its disposal. He felt that Germany would be able to handle the Soviet Union well enough in battle. (Dupuy 1179) This confidence in Germany's military was over inflated for several reasons. During World War I, the Soviet army had performed poorly against German troopers. Hitler and his armies were coming off fresh victories in France and the Low Countries as well as other parts in Europe like Denmark and Norway. Soviet troops were thought to be in a weakened state because of Stalin's infamous purges of the 1930s. This belief was reinforced due to the Soviets' sub-par effort in fighting the Russo-Finnish war. Above all else, however, Hitler's ego played a large role in his confidence in the German prowess and the superiority of the German people. That overconfidence and egotism would eventually lead the German operation in the Soviet Union to unfruitful grounds, like it did in many other theaters in the war. (Goldston 149)

In planning Barbarossa, the proposed operation went through many names and proposals, as any plans of its size and magnitude do. The operation was originally named "Operation Fritz" and was later renamed to "Directive 21." On December 18, 1940, the operation was renamed a final time to "Operation Barbarossa." Old German legends held that in a time of great need, Barbarossa, also called Frederick I, would rise up and restore Germany to power. (Dupuy 1179) If Operation Barbarossa were successful in knocking out the Soviet Union as a world power and putting it under a German sphere of influence, a restoration of power is exactly what would happen.

Several plans for Barbarossa were drawn up in the months of planning. Generalfeldmarschall Friedrich Paulus, famed for his command of German troops at the Battle of Stalingrad, played a key role in all of the planning of Operation Barbarossa. The first plan, called the Marcks Plan, called for two army groups. One army group would have marched through Smolensk to Moscow. After conquering Moscow, the group would have then turned south to meet up with the second army group. The second would have begun its campaign by assaulting Kiev, followed up by meeting the first group at the city of Kharkov. Upon meeting with the second group, the combined force would have then marched onto Stalingrad. With Moscow, Kiev, and Stalingrad under German hands and a smaller force assaulting Leningrad, the rest of Russia would surely crumble. (Dupuy 1180)

A second plan, called the OKH Plan, called for three army groups, North, South, and Center, instead of two. Army Group North would have swept through the Baltic States on its way to Leningrad. Army Group Center would have followed a similar path to that of the first army group in the Marcks Plan, marching to Moscow by way of Smolensk. Army Group South would have followed the second army group in the Marcks Plan, getting to Kiev followed by Stalingrad. There were three major differences in these plans. In the Marcks Plan, there was no separate army group set aside to capture Leningrad, while in the OKH Plan there was. Also in the Marcks Plan, the two army groups eventually met up for their march on Stalingrad, while in the OKH Plan each army group was largely on its own. Because Army Group Center would not meet up with Army Group South in the OKH Plan, eastward expansion of Moscow at its own will was expected of Army Group Center. Likewise, eastward expansion of Stalingrad was expected of Army Group South upon capturing the city. Both the OKH and Marcks Plans were eventually discarded in favor for the final plan, which contained elements of the two previous plans. (Davis 409-410)

In the final plan, three army groups were called for: Army Group North, Army Group Center, and Army Group South. Army Group North retained the same responsibilities that it had had in the OKH Plan; it was to sweep through the Baltic States and assault Leningrad. Army Group Center was to conquer Smolensk, much like the two previous plans had dictated. After control of Smolensk was achieved, however, Army Group Center would then throw the bulk of its resources north to help Army Group North capture Leningrad. This was to be done at the expense of driving onwards toward Moscow. Only after Leningrad was subdued would Army Group Center be allowed to press operations on Moscow. Like the OKH Plan, eastward expansion of Moscow was expected of Army Group Center upon the demolition of Moscow's protectors. Army Group South retained the battle plan it had for the two previous plans; it was to go from Kiev to Stalingrad. Unlike the OKH Plan, however, eastward expansion was not immediately expected of Army Group South. The "A-A Line" was the

designated objective of Hitler's Operation Barbarossa. It was a 1,250-mile line stretching from Archangel on the Arctic to Astrakahn on the Caspian Sea. Hitler believed Russians east of the line could be contained with armed patrols. (Davis 410)

The date for the operation was set at May 15, 1941. This, German planners believed, would give Nazi forces plenty of time to get to the A-A Line before winter was out. Nearly one hundred sixty army divisions were set aside for the invasion, compared to just sixty that were left to defend mainland Europe from any possible British invasion. (Goldston 149) The arrangements and planning for Barbarossa were then done; what needed to happen next was physical preparation for it.

While German planners laid down the guidelines for an invasion of the Soviet Union, they made several deadly assumptions and underestimations. Planners estimated that there were only 75 divisions in the Soviet Union that were either equipped well enough, trained well enough, or morally motivated enough to fruitfully oppose any German force. (Goldston 149) Because of this weakness in the army, it was generally agreed that the Russian army would collapse if any pressure were to be applied to it. They then assumed that there would not be a large response to the invasion by the Russian public and that the Soviet military would be unable to recruit peasants to fight against the Nazis. That assumption tied in closely with the belief that the Russian people, after years of Stalinist and Bolshevik repression, would be acclimated to that style of treatment and more willing to tolerate German repression with little fuss.

Though the internal planning for Operation Barbarossa was ultra-secret, the Soviet Union could not help but look across their western border without suspicion. Being at war with the same nations and having economic agreements with each other, the two nations seemed to be equal partners. September 27, 1940, marked the day when the Tripartite Pact was signed by representatives of Japan, Germany, and Italy. The Soviet Union was shocked and Stalin immediately became suspicious. The Soviet Union fired off a request to Berlin asking to be included in the Tripartite Pact. Hitler did not even respond to the request. He did attempt to soothe Soviet apprehensions and suspicions by inviting Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov to Berlin for discussions. When Molotov arrived in Berlin on November 12, 1940, Hitler attempted to distract him from the issue at hand by making vague references to Russia's inclusion into future spheres of influence that would be available as soon as the war was over. Molotov responded with a line of questioning that shocked Hitler in its abrasiveness. Talks were tense throughout the meeting until they were forced to end by an appearance of British bombers. During and after Hitler's attempt to assuage Soviet fears, preparation for Operation Barbarossa continued. (Goldston 148)

The original date for Barbarossa was set at May 15, 1941. This date was important; it allowed time for German troops to accomplish all the goals Barbarossa had set forth before the onset of the Russian winter, a historical death-trap for foreign troops invading the Motherland. Due to its own allies, however, Germany was forced to postpone the invasion date by four weeks. On October 28, 1940, Benito Mussolini of Italy announced to Hitler that Italian troops had invaded Greece by saying, "Führer, we are on the march! Victorious Italian troops crossed the Greco-Albanian border at dawn today!" Those "victorious" troops, however, were driven behind the border they had started in by the Greeks a week later. Albania was not the only place Mussolini's military was having problems; in Italian Libya, the British forces under Bernard Montgomery captured 130,000 troops, 1024 guns, and 500 tanks. Not only were the numbers lost devastating to Italy, but so were British losses: they had lost only 500 men. Nor were the losses restricted to foreign conquests; on November 11, 1940, the Italian fleet stationed at Taranto was absolutely decimated by the Royal Navy. All of these events happened within a relatively short period of time and Mussolini desperately needed Hitler to bail him out. Hitler was forced to divert troops and supplies that would have otherwise been used in preparing for Operation Barbarossa, delaying the invasion date. (Goldston 150-151)

Because of the failures of the Italian military in the Balkans, Hitler feared an Anglo-Greek union that might flank him during Operation Barbarossa. He thus massed troops in Bulgaria, a German ally, to invade Greece and deprive Britain the opportunity of a foothold on mainland Europe. While amassing troops in Bulgaria, he pressured the Yugoslavian government into making a deal with him. When the Yugoslavian government finally buckled under German pressure, the people of Belgrade immediately revolted and overthrew the government, declaring Yugoslavian's intention to not become a German puppet state. This move was ultimately what postponed Operation Barbarossa, as the German military struggled to make preparations for the immediate invasion of Yugoslavia that Hitler demanded in his rage. On April 6, 1941, German troops invaded both Yugoslavia and Greece. Yugoslavian forces were completely overran and their army surrendered by April 17th. Ten days afterward, the Greeks surrendered and the small British force that remained was forced to pull off yet another Dunkirk-style retreat. Hitler also sent troops reinforcing those in Africa to help recoup the Italian losses, although never enough to pull off a decisive victory there. He needed all the troops he could get a hold of for the pending attack on the Soviet Union. After the operations in Greece and Yugoslavia were completed, Hitler then resumed his full-throttle buildup along the Soviet-German border. (Goldston 151)

Although the buildup on the Soviet border was done with the utmost care and secrecy, the size and scope of the operation was such that information could not help but leak out. The physical buildup of men and materiel was too obvious for anyone to overlook completely. The British heard of the operation by using their ULTRA device that had cracked the Nazi Enigma secret code. Even though the Soviet Union and Great Britain were at war, Winston Churchill tried to inform Stalin of the impending operation. Stalin ignored him. (Davis 409) The Soviet spy Richard Sorge, who had ties with the German Embassy in Tokyo, also attempted to warn Stalin of Operation Barbarossa. (Polmar et al. 327) Stalin ignored all of the warnings that flooded his office. He did not believe that the Germans would invade the Soviet Union and thought that all the warnings he was receiving were British propaganda aimed at nothing else but sewing discontent between allies. He even ordered all anti-aircraft guns in Poland to not fire at any German aircraft in order to not provoke Hitler. When the invasion of Russia finally began, the impact of it hit Stalin so hard that locked himself in his office for five days. (McCombs et al. 419)

On June 22, 1941, at 7:00 A.M., Joseph Göbbels had this to say to the German people:

Weighed down with heavy cares, condemned to months of silence, I can at last speak freely-German people! At this moment a march is taking place that, for its extent, compares with the greatest the world has ever seen. I have decided again today to place the fate and future of the Reich and our people in the hands of our soldiers. May God aid us, especially in this fight. (Fischer 468)

Just a few hours before that, German troops had begun pounding Russian positions with artillery fire and Luftwaffe aircraft. Göbbels was not lying when he said the operation compared to the greatest (if, by saying that, he meant largest) the world had ever seen. The manpower and machinery assembled for the operation was staggering: 153 divisions (more than 3,000,000 men), 600,000 vehicles, 3,580 tanks, 7,184 pieces of artillery, and 2,740 airplanes. The blitzkrieg that had been so effective against France was again a resounding success. The first three months of the campaign went according to plan. Army Group North reached the Baltic Sea in less than a month. About a month afterwards, Army Group Center conquered Smolensk. For Army Group South, they captured Kiev. (Fischer 468-469) All these successes boosted the German High Command's ego, Hitler most of all. After the first three months, however, the blistering successes of the German military began to wane, due in part to Hitler's elitism and arrogance.

When German troops first marched into Russia, they were welcomed as heroes. The peasants of the Ukraine and elsewhere had suffered immensely under Stalin's Five-Year Plans and his Soviet collective farms, which had done nothing but bring back a kind of serfdom Russia seemed unable to rid herself of. Hopes were high that with the coming of the Germans there would be a rise in the standard of living similar to a level that Germans themselves enjoyed. Those hopes were dashed immediately after Wehrmacht troops rolled by peasant towns. Immediately following the German troopers were Hitler's Einsatzgruppen, or extermination squads. These squads would round up undesirables such as Jews, gays, and intellectuals. The undesirables were then shot. The Russian people, horrified at the atrocities committed against their brethren, began to form resistance groups. The groups they formed began to harass German supply lines, which were becoming long and cumbersome due to the tremendous amount of space they had conquered. Because of the harassments, German troops were no longer limited by time and the hours of daylight in a day, they were limited by supplies. (Bullock 704; Fischer 469-470; Davis 409-410)

Being limited by supplies were not the only woes German troops faced after their initial resounding successes. Hitler often would switch military operations before others were finished, such as switching from encouraging the conquest of Moscow to emphasizing the importance of capturing Leningrad. The distances among the operations he focused on were, for the most part, very large. Such large distances slowed down fighting even more, as armies had to sit and wait while reinforcements arrived. Because the operation as a whole was not methodical, not only were armies forced to waste time but there was no one area that delivered a knock-out blow, as might have happened had Hitler concentrated all his resources on one area at a time. He felt he was able to waste his time on pet-project operations because all estimates were that the Russian Army was done for and Leningrad would be captured within weeks. He failed to realize that Soviet troops were following a tactic similar to that used against Napoleon when he invaded; they were simply pulling back, waiting for winter to come, the enemy to overstretch his supply lines, and enough time to get reorganized. (Fischer 470-473)

As Hitler and the German High Command had planned for a quick blitzkrieg-style victory over the Soviet Union, they were left unprepared when Hitler's waste of precious weeks and the postponement of the operation meant that the German troops were caught in the Soviet winter. The winter slowed down supply lines tremendously and it became common for tanks to run out of fuel after a few miles of advancement a day. The quality of life for the average German trooper fell dramatically; they had never been issued winter clothing. Many found themselves unable to fight, as they were more concerned with keeping warm in a winter that had reached lows unseen for decades before. With winter descending on the German troops, they were held at the places that the Soviet army would drive them back: Leningrad, Moscow, and Stalingrad. German troops would never get to the imaginary A-A Line. The dream of a quick knock-out blow of the Soviet Union died and the final goals of Operation Barbarossa were never achieved. (Fischer 472)

The effects of Operation Barbarossa were long-lasting. The backstabbing the Soviet Union suffered energized its people, who eventually came to call World War II "The Great Patriotic War." The Soviet Union also used Barbarossa as an excuse to expand its influence on Eastern Bloc countries after World War II, justifying its repression with the need for a buffer zone between the Motherland and western powers. The excuse was especially used in East Germany. Barbarossa contributed in large part to the Soviet Union's refusal to consolidate East Germany with West Germany, as a reunited Germany was obviously not in the Soviet Union's best interests. The Soviet Union was as suspicious of western powers as ever, especially under Stalin. The animosity between the German and Russian peoples persisted for many years afterwards.

Hitler's plan to invade the Soviet Union had a long, lustrous, and influential history. From its conception as an answer to Germany's woes of labor, food, and lebensraum insufficiencies the operation was humongous. Set up by the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, the invasion was due to make waves in the political, military, and social worlds. With many plans proposed and set aside and the Soviet army apparently on a downward trend, the plan appeared to be rock-solid. That perception continued even through delays caused by belligerent allies and uncontrollable emotion. The first few months of the operation went without a hitch. Due to Hitler's arrogance toward the Russian army and his persecution toward the Russian people, the operation was doomed to failure. The winter finished off any hopes of achieving the ultimate goals of the operation. Even in failure, the operation lived on through its influences on Soviet policy and attitude toward western powers and Germany for decades after the operation had begun. Truly, Barbarossa was an invasion to trump all other invasions.

Article:Operation Barbarossa - Synopsis

Operation Barbarossa: The German Invasion of the Soviet Union

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